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#### NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

10 October 2012

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//<del>FOUO)</del> Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U/<del>FOUO)</del> Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 June 2012 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(U//<del>FOUO)</del> The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

GEORGE ELLARD Inspector General

RAJESH DE General Counsel

(U//<del>FOUO)</del> I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KEINH B. ALEXANDER General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

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Approved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

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	Violated Law, Regulation, or Policy and Were Substantiated during the Quarter, as well as Actions Taken as a Result of the Violations
	I.A. (U) Intelligence Activities Conducted under Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 Authority
	I.A.1 (U) Unintentional Targeting or Database Queries against U.S. Persons -P.L. 86-36 (USPs) or Foreign Persons in the United States
	(S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) During the first quarter of calendar year 2012 (CY2012), the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) continued
(b)(3)-P.L.	As a result, in June 2012, NSA/CSS's primary tasking tools for telephone and Internet selectors contained approximately active selectors, consistent with the number reported last quarter.
(8)(4)	(U// <del>FOUO)</del> During the second quarter of CY2012, signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysts in stances inadvertently targeted communications to, from, or about USPs while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking or performed a query using a USP selector. Unless otherwise specified, all intercepts, query results, and reports have been deleted or destroyed as required by United States SIGINT Directive SP0018.
	I.A.1.a. (U) Tasking Errors (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions during the second quarter, NSA analysts performed a query or tasked a selector without doing the necessary research to determine whether the target was a USP. On each occasion, the query was deleted or the selector was removed.
	(TS//SI//REL) was erroneously targeted and collection occurred for five minutes because an collection operator did not while performing a systems check. All collected data has been purged.
9) (3) -P.L	an NSA analyst discovered that a selector for a valid foreign intelligence target had been tasked while the target was in the United States since  The query and the results were deleted.
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA auditor discovered that selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets had remained tasked while the targets visited the United States There was no collection.
	an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a USP, which had been detasked had been erroneously retasked. The selector was detasked. No dissemination occurred.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	during tasking, an NSA collection site
	The state of the s
On the same day, the site detasked	d the telephone numbers. No collection
occurred.	(b) (1)
	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
-(S/ <u>/SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)</u> Onoc	
forwarded the inadvertent into	ercept of a possible USP. All non-compliant
data was purged, and no dissemination occurred.	
<del>(TS//SI//NF)</del> Or occasions	
- The second sec	associated with a kidnapping incident.
the selectors were discovered t	o belong to USPs. The telephone numbers were
detasked, and no collection occurred.	(b) (1)
<u></u>	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, GBR)	an NSA analyst discovered that a
selector tasked	
and the state of t	pelonged to a USP. There were no
indications before that the target wa	as a USP. all
collection and queries were identified and deleted	
	1
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	reported targeting a
foreign national located in the United States. The	e selector was detasked, and no collection
occurred.	
	(b) (1)
I.A.1.b. (U) Database Queries	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	(b) (1) (b) (2) - B T 96-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36
	(b)(3)-P.I. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(U// <del>FOUO)</del> On occasions during the	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) second quarter, analysts performed overly broad
(U// <del>FOUO)</del> Onoccasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) second quarter, analysts performed overly broad
(U// <del>FOUO)</del> On occasions during the	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about
(U// <del>FOUO)</del> Onoccasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) second quarter, analysts performed overly broad
(U// <del>FOUO)</del> Onoccasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about
(U// <del>FOUO)</del> On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.	(b) (3) -P.I. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.  (U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On of those occasions, the	second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise  (b) (3) -P.I. 86-36  queries returned results from the database. The
(U// <del>FOUO)</del> On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.	second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise  (b) (3) -P.I. 86-36  queries returned results from the database. The
(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.  (U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On of those occasions, the	second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise  (b) (3) -P.I. 86-36  queries returned results from the database. The d, and no reports were issued. Analysts who
(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.  (U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On of those occasions, the query results were deleted or aged off, as required performed these queries were counseled by their	second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise  (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  queries returned results from the database. The d, and no reports were issued. Analysts who management.
(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.  (U// <del>FOUO</del> ) On of those occasions, the query results were deleted or aged off, as required	second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise  (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  queries returned results from the database. The d, and no reports were issued. Analysts who management.
(U//FOUO) On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.  (U//FOUO) On of those occasions, the query results were deleted or aged off, as required performed these queries were counseled by their (U) Procedural and other errors contribute	second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise  (b) (3) -P.I. 86-36  that produced imprecise (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  equeries returned results from the database. The d, and no reports were issued. Analysts who management.
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(U//FOUO) On occasions during the or poorly constructed database queries that potent USPs. These queries used results.  (U//FOUO) On of those occasions, the query results were deleted or aged off, as required performed these queries were counseled by their (U) Procedural and other errors contribute	second quarter, analysts performed overly broad tially targeted and/or returned information about  that produced imprecise  (b) (3) -P.I. 86-36  that produced imprecise (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  queries returned results from the database. The d, and no reports were issued. Analysts who management.  ed to the following incidents:  an NSA analyst
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	selectors. The analyst was counseled on proper querying procedures, and all results were deleted.
b) (1) b) (3) P.L. 86-3	(S//SI/NF) an NSA analyst performed queries on a foreign intelligence target while he was known to be in the United States. The query returned no results, and no dissemination occurred.
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst performed a query on selectors believed to be associated with a foreign intelligence target. The analyst then learned from the customer that the target was a USP. The query results were not retained. To avoid recurrence, additional deconfliction procedures will be used with this customer when conducting target analysis.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed a query in a raw traffic database on The query returned no results, and no dissemination occurred.
•	made queries on selectors associated with USPs. NSA suspended the personnel's accesses to relevant databases and provided remedial training.  (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)  an NSA analyst discovered that database queries  were still running even though the consent- to-monitoring agreement had expired  the analyst stopped all queries. No collection or reporting occurred. The organization is developing a system solution to avoid recurrences of this type.
5) (1) 5) (3)=P-L86-3)	(TS//SI//NF) after verifying the locations of targets, an NSA analyst failed to remove one U.S. selector before querying a database. The query returned no results, and no dissemination occurred.
37(3)	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)  an NSA analyst  when the target was determined to be a USP. The query results were deleted on 29 April, and no reporting occurred.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions— an NSA analyst ran queries On all occasions, the analyst deleted the query results, and no dissemination occurred.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered while reviewing database query results that a valid foreign target had been in the United States but the analyst failed to alert a co-worker of the target's status. The co-worker viewed query results for the time the target was in the United States. All queries and results were deleted, and no reporting occurred. The division instituted a new alert and review process to prevent similar incidents.
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst ran a query on a selector that was later determined to belong to a USP. The query returned no results.
(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86	-36

•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA auditor discovered that during
	an analyst had conducted multiple queries using U.S. terms as selectors.  The query returned no results. The auditor conducted training for the analysts on proper database queries.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA auditor discovered that an analyst had performed a query The analyst deleted the results, and no dissemination occurred.
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed a query The results were deleted.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst initiated a query in a raw traffic database. The analyst aborted the query, and no results were returned.
(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst ran a query on a selector associated with a USP. The analyst deleted the results, and no reporting occurred.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst, familiarizing himself with database querying procedures, executed an old query involving an authorized foreign intelligence target later discovered to be a USP. The analyst deleted the query and results.
(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 302	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed a series of queries information related to a possible threat to the United States. At the time, the NSA analyst believed that it was permissible when a potential threat existed. No are sufficiently approximately appro
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)  analyst had performed a database query on a USP selector. The analyst deleted the query and destroyed any derived information. The auditor reminded the analyst not to query USP selectors.
• ·	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst queried several selectors considered to be USPs. The results were deleted, and no dissemination occurred.
·	(TS//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) after detasking known selectors in the United States, an NSA analyst queried those same selectors.  The query results were deleted, and the collection was purged.
	(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an auditor discovered that
(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-3	an NSA analyst had performed three queries  query had returned results, the records had aged off.  Although the
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that selectors query while the target was in the United States. The
	analyst stopped the query and deleted the results. No reports were generated as a result of the query

• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a
selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained tasked while the target was in
the United Statesthe analyst detasked the selector
the United States;
the analyst deleted the query
and the results.
• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that,
although the selectors of targets had been detasked the
United States on
The queries for both of the targets were stopped (b) (1)
• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(S//SI//KEL 10 USA, I VE I) all INSA alialyst discovered that
the United States from The analyst deleted the results, and no
dissemination occurred.
(0)(0)(0) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that one of
several database queries during a target's travel to the United States from The analyst was aware and
stopped all queries on the target's selector. the analyst deleted
all query results, and no reporting occurred.
and quest, and are represented a contract.
I.A.1.c. (U) Detasking Delays
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) discovered that the
selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets had mistakenly been left on task while the
targets were in the United States. No reports were issued.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a
selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task after the target had
arrived in the United States on The selector was detasked The
collection was deleted, and no reports were issued.  (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst identified collection
indicating that an authorized foreign target had traveled to the United States on
the analyst had detasked
the target The remaining selectors were detasked, and the collection was marked for purging.
The remaining selectors were detasked, and the collection was marked for purging.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that
selectors associated with a target traveling in the United States had been
detasked No collection, reporting, or dissemination occurred. (b) (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that
the selectors of authorized foreign targets had remained tasked while the targets were in the
United States. Although the analyst had detasked all selectors
(b) (1)
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<u></u>
New procedures have been instituted to avoid recurrence of this
problem. (b) (1)
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the selector of an authorized foreign target had remained tasked while the target was in the United States Data collected during this period was deleted To avoid recurrence of this problem, managers established new branch-wide notification procedures.
SI/REL TO USA, FVEY   an NSA analyst realized that a selector, believed to have been detasked   was still tasked. The target had entered the United States on   On the analyst detasked the selector   associated with the selector. The resulting data from database queries was deleted on   (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//SI//R.EL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst discovered that a valid foreign intelligence target had traveled to the United States on A systems error caused a delay in detasking when a systems administrator facilitated the detasking. No reporting occurred.
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst determined that the targets of another Intelligence Community agency had entered the United States on NSA had detasked these selectors however,
nalysts purged
records (b) (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
that selectors belonging to an authorized foreign target had been detasked the United States. the analyst deleted the collection associated with the relevant selector. No reports were issued.
that selectors belonging to an authorized foreign target had been detasked the United States. the analyst deleted the collection associated with the relevant selector. No reports were issued.
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that selectors belonging to an authorized foreign target had been detasked the United States. the analyst deleted the collection associated with the relevant selector. No reports were issued.
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that selectors belonging to an authorized foreign target had been detasked the United States. the analyst deleted the collection associated with the relevant selector. No reports were issued.  (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that, despite with a target on selectors mistakenly remained tasked. The analyst discovered the error when attempting to retask the selectors. No collection occurred, and no reports were issued.  (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an IC member notified NSA that a valid foreign target had to the United States on No collection or dissemination occurred. (b) (1)
that selectors belonging to an authorized foreign target had been detasked the United States. the analyst deleted the collection associated with the relevant selector. No reports were issued.  (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that, despite with a target on selectors mistakenly remained tasked. The analyst discovered the error when attempting to retask the selectors. No collection occurred, and no reports were issued.  (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an IC member notified NSA that a valid foreign target had to the United States on No collection or dissemination occurred.  (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
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(S//SI//REL TO USE, FVEY)
an NSA analyst learned that the target was in the United States. No collection occurred,
and the selector was detasked. (b) (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that tasked
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that tasked
selectors had not been detasked despite notification of the target's arrival in the
United States the analyst detasked the selectors and
all collection and query results
were deleted. No reporting occurred. A senior analyst counseled the analysts involved about their responsibility to act on the United States.
their responsibility to act onthe United States.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an auditor discovered that a selector
remained on task when the target had traveled to the United States. A systems error caused
improper detasking, and collection continued. The collection was not reviewed, and no reporting
occurred. (b) (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
I.A.2 (U) (b) (3) –18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 Usc 3024(i)
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
I.A.3 (U) Unauthorized Access
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
to perform a query and unknowingly access a raw traffic database
without authorization. There was no need to detask, and no dissemination occurred. The
to avoid recurrence of this problem. (b) (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(U/ <del>FOUO)</del> a software update was determined to have inadvertently disabled a processor that
In the future, all software coding will be scrutinized for compliance before (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
program updates.
program apatico.
(U// <del>FOUO) On occasions during the second quarter, raw traffic database access was</del>
not terminated when access was no longer required. On each occasion, access was terminated

I.A.4 (U) Data-Handling Error
e-mail to an IC customer not authorized to see the information. The customer confirmed deletion of the material  The analyst was reminded about dissemination policies. No reports were issued.  (b) (1)  (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
-(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned that USP information was shared in an e-mail with IC agency analysts who were not authorized to receive the information. the analyst requested that the recipient's delete the e-mail.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that an e-mail sent to IC customers contained the identity of a USP. The e-mail was recalled and reissued after the identity had been masked. The analyst was counseled on proper minimization procedures.  (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst mistakenly disseminated the name of a USP in an e-mail to a customer. The information was recalled
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) analyst disseminated a briefing in an e-mail to authorized personnel, who did not realize the briefing included unpublished information and who then forwarded the e-mail to unauthorized personnel. Recipients were asked to delete the e-mail, and deletion was confirmed.
(S//SI//NF) an NSA analyst mistakenly disseminated raw traffic to an unauthorized customer. The customer confirmed deletion of the material The analyst was reminded of dissemination policies.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)  an NSA analyst discovered that a valid foreign intelligence target had traveled to the United States on the analyst deleted the data derived from database queries executed during that time. Although no reporting occurred, an analyst had provided unminimized in an e-mail to another IC analyst outside the SIGINT production chain. The e-mail was deleted  (b) (1)  (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst disseminated raw traffic to an unauthorized customer. The recipient of the data stated that he had not reviewed the files and had deleted them
disseminated USP information through e-mail to IC agency counterparts who were not authorized to receive the information. The information was shared on four occasions. The error occurred because the analysts misinterpreted procedures concerning the dissemination of USP identities. The analysts recalled the e-mails and asked the recipients to delete the information. The analysts were counseled on the procedures and directed to retake appropriate training. No reports were issued.

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<del>-(T</del>	<del>S//SI//NF)</del>	an NSA analyst inadvertently provided a sel	lector	
	with a USP	sent to IC agency personnel who were not a		
		thought to be associated with a valid foreign		
	ked the recipients to destroy			
destruction		lyst was counseled about the need to protect		
		he provision of selectors not previously inclu-	ded in	
serialized	reports. No reports were iss	sued.		
<del>-(T</del>	S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY	On occasions	the	
,		authority to unauthorized recipients in a chat	room. The	
informatio	n was recalled, and the reci	pients were instructed to destroy all copies.	, /	
1 4 5 (11)	O		(b) (1)	
I.A.5 (U)	Systems Error		(b) (3)-P.L. 8	16-36
<del>(S</del> )	//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY	a database technical team de	etermined that	
,	l error caused			
		Data was collected but not reviewed or	r forwarded.	
	were collected were purged		the	
collection	system software was update	ed, replacing earlier versions that had caused	the problem.	
_(\$	//SI//REL TO USA. FVEY)	an analyst discovered that	a selector	
(	o have been detasked	because it belonged to a USP was s		
		he selector was detasked and all resulting coll	lection purged	
	A software patch was ins		1 0	
/11	WEOLIAN TO THE RESERVE TO THE RESERV		1, 1	
from	// <del>FOUO)</del>	an unauthorized query was discovered to hav Developers are working to create a system		
	ining to avoid recurrence.	Developers are working to create a system	is solution of	
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36			(b) (1)	
i.B. (U) i	Foreign Intelligence Sur	veillance Act (FISA)	(b) (3)-P.L. 86	6-36
I.B.1. (U)	NSA/CSS Title I FISA			
IR1a (		(b) (1)		
1.D.1.a. (	O) Detasking Delays	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36		
<del>(S</del> )	<del>//SI//</del> NF)	an NSA analyst discovered that an e-mail sel	ector	
authorized	for tasking			
		the analyst detasked the target's sele		
	1 . 1 1	but overlooked		
	or was detasked om the selector	No reports had been issued, and all co	ollection	
derived in	on the selector	was deleted.		
(T	S// <b>SI//NF)</b> /	an NSAattempted to task sele	ctors under a	
FISA Cou		and discovered that the selectors were st	ill tasked	
	previous Court Order, which			
fa	ailed to terminate the tasking	g as requestedrecords were purged		
	The second secon			
distinct the same of the same				

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
I.B.1.b. (U) Unauthorized Targeting
General Counsel with new guidance about certain telephony selectors  As a result of this notice, NSA analysts detasked selectors on Collected information has been deleted or purged; one report has been recalled.
an NSA analyst discovered that a selector, approved for tasking under FISA authority, had inadvertently been tasked through a typographical error. The incorrect selector was detasked
I.B.2. <del>(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)</del> FISA
I.B.2.a. (U) Database Queries (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//NF) NSA notified DOJ that an estimated queries in had not been reviewed. Some of the queries Since learning of this situation, NSA analysts have been reviewing and reconciling past queries. To avoid recurrence, NSA is working on a solution to improve the performance of auditing tools.  (S//SL//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA auditor discovered that an NSA analyst deleted the query and results  (S//SL// REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered an overly broad database query The analyst immediately deleted the query and results.  (S//SL// REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA auditor determined that an NSA analyst had queried a raw traffic database pefore conducting required research. The analyst deleted the query and was counseled.
I.B.2.b. (U) Unauthorized Access
(U//FOUO)  during a management review of all Memoranda of (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36  Understanding (MOUs) for detailed and assigned IC personnel within NSA, the MOU authorizing was discovered not to have been finalized.  Nevertheless briefings and training associated with the accesses and was technically under full operational control of the Director, NSA. Upon discovery of this incident, all accesses to were removed until the MOU is finalized.

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) An incident was reported upon initial discovery last
quarter as an incident, but NSA personnel were
discovered potentially to have had unauthorized access to data. This occurred because
the data and personnel had not
been trained or cleared for the access.
Measures were taken to correct the problem
L.B.2.c. (U) Data-Handling Error (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst disseminated
information The information had been improperly disseminated via e-mail to a distribution list that contained individuals not authorized to view the information. The e-mails were recalled, and the analyst was counseled on proper handling of this data and the need to ensure that recipients are authorized to receive the data.
I.B.2.d. (U) Systems Error
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA technical director discovered that a systems error had caused a delay in the purging of files containing  The error was caused by a problem in software code used to determine the age of some files.
modifications were made to the code. All files were deleted, and no dissemination or reporting occurred.
(b) (1)
I.B.3. <del>(TS//SI//NF)</del> Business Records Order (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3
(b) (1) (b) (3) -P. I. 96-3
I.B.3. <del>(TS//SI//NF)</del> Business Records Order (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3
I.B.3. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records Order  (U) Nothing to report.
I.B.3. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records Order  (U) Nothing to report.  I.B.4. (TS//SI//NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order
I.B.3. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records Order  (U) Nothing to report.  I.B.4. (TS//SI//NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order  (TS//SI//NF) The PR/TT Order expired on 9 December 2011 and has not been renewed.
I.B.3. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records Order  (U) Nothing to report.  I.B.4. (TS//SI//NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order  (TS//SI//NF) The PR/TT Order expired on 9 December 2011 and has not been renewed.  I.B.5. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA)
(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3  (U) Nothing to report.  I.B.4. (TS//SI//NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order  (TS//SI//NF) The PR/TT Order expired on 9 December 2011 and has not been renewed.  I.B.5. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA)  I.B.5.a. (U) FAA Section 702  (U/FOUO) NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure that FAA §702 data that is required to be purged from NSA/CSS databases. NSA created a
I.B.3. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records Order  (U) Nothing to report.  I.B.4. (TS//SI//NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order  (TS//SI//NF) The PR/TT Order expired on 9 December 2011 and has not been renewed.  I.B.5. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA)  I.B.5.a. (U) FAA Section 702  (U//FOUO) NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure that FAA §702 data that
I.B.3. (TS//SI//NF) Business Records Order  (U) Nothing to report.  I.B.4. (TS//SI//NF) Pen Register/Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Order  (TS//SI//NF) The PR/TT Order expired on 9 December 2011 and has not been renewed.  I.B.5. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA)  I.B.5.a. (U) FAA Section 702  (U//FOUO) NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure that FAA §702 data that is required to be purged is purged from NSA/CSS databases. NSA created a

#### TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

both occasions, the selector's were detasked and all data collected under the incorrect certification was purged. a selector was discovered to have been improperly tasked. (U/<del>/FOUO)</del> The selector was detasked, and all collection was purged. I.B.5.a.ii. (U) Tasking Errors during the second quarter, analysts did not perform the (U/<del>FOUO)</del> necessary research to establish the location of targets. On each occasion, upon discovery, the selector was removed and the collection was purged. (b) (3)-P.L. (TS//SI//REL TO USA. FVEY) NSA analysts discovered that selectors for foreign intelligence targets had been tasked incorrectly. The selectors were detasked, and non-compliant data was purged or marked for purging. No reports were issued. (U//<del>FOUO)</del> selectors were incorrectly tasked because of typographical errors. All associated collection has been purged. (Ŝ//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst queried a USP selector after had failed. No results were returned. (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (U/<del>FOUO)</del> an NSA analyst discovered that a selector had been improperly tasked and immediately detasked the selector. All data has been purged. (U//FOUO) a selector was discovered to have been tasked without proper NSA targeting approval. The selector was detasked, and the collection was purged. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a foreign intelligence target belonged to a USP. The selector was immediately detasked. The query returned no results; therefore no purging was required and no reports were issued. (b) (1) I.B.5.a.iii. (U) Database Queries (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions in the second quarter, analysts performed overly broad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially targeted and returned information about USPs. These queries used that produced imprecise results. (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (U//FOUO) On of those occasions, the queries returned results from the database. The results were deleted or aged off, as required, and no reports/were issued. Analysts who performed these queries were counseled by their management. (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed a query on a U.S. selector. The query and results were deleted.

(TS//SI//NF) an NSA auditor discovered that, an
NSA analyst had initiated a query of
All the queries and results were deleted
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed queries using
U.S. selectors. The queries and the results were deleted.
I.B.5.a.iv. (U) Detasking Delays (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) the detasking of a selector was
delayed. an NSA analyst had detasked associated
with a target upon discovering that he was in the United States as of
the single selector was detasked and collection was purged.
-(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst detasked a target's
selectors after discovering that the target had traveled to the United States on On
the analyst identified had
not been detasked. The selectors were immediately detasked, and the collection was purged
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a tasked
selector the United States. After further research, the analyst discovered that
this selector
The selector was detasked, and the information was purged. No reports had been issued (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(TS//SI//NF) notified NSA that an e-mail account
the United States on that day. NSA detasked some of the selectors associated with
the e-mail account but not others, because of a misunderstanding of detasking
procedures. The NSA analyst detasked the rest of the selectors/ All collection
was purged.
-(TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst discovered that collection for a selector
that had been properly detasked by NSA on because of the target's travel to the
United States All non-compliant data collected has been purged.
Air non-compitant data confected has been purged.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) selectors were not
detasked in collection systems because of a software problem. NSA immediately performed a
of all the selectors when the error was discovered. A software patch has been installed to correct the problem. All collection has been purged. (b) (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) records that should have been purged
were discovered to have remained in a raw traffic repository because of a
processing error. The records have since been purged.
(TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst discovered that collection for a selector
that had been properly detasked on
United States the NSA analyst
responsible for was unaware of the detasking request and
(b) (1)
-TOP-SECRET//SI//NOFORN (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

-TOP SECRET//SI//	NOFORN	(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L.	86-36
All information col	lected during the target	a's visit has been	
purged.			
was not detasked the error was disinformation has been purged.	a selector that was a scovered and the selector	marked for detasking or was detasked. All	
of the selectors.    TS://SI://REL TO USA, FVEY		requested detasking was purged (b) (1)	
selector associated with a foreign intelligence target in the United States or The selector was compliant data has been purged.  (TS//SI//NF) an IC partner of detasked when the target partner had mistakenly issued a tasking, rather than a partner ceased receiving all data associated with that all collection.	detasked discovered a selector the detasking request	nen the target entered and all non-	. 86-36
-(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) had remained tasked when the target traveled to the U improper detasking, and collection continued. The co		is error caused	
routed collection to an IC partner and	st was discovered to had not to the intended relation had not been i	ngested into its	
I.B.5.a.v. (U) Data-Handling Errors		(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L	. 86-36
- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) have been improperly stored in a directory not certified information has been marked for purging, and NSA is	and the second s	on-compliant	
have been improperly placed in a repository not certife error. All information has been purged from the non-corrected.	compliant system and	use of a systems the error has been	
named USP data it had received from NSA.	purged the	notified NSA of a name.	

<del>(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)</del>	an NSA analyst processed FAA §702
	The data was deleted from the
tool.	
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) containing FAA §702 data to a directory not certified for files were moved to an FAA-approved location.	(b) (1)
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) software had been written to select and post FAA §702-d authorized to receive such data. NSA determined that the insufficiently communicated to the software developers a recurrence.	e dissemination policy was
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) containing FAA information to two NSA contractors who The e-mail was recalled.	an NSA employee sent an e-mail are not authorized to receive the data.
data to a person not authorized to receive the information the information	an analyst disseminated FAA §702  The recipient confirmed deletion of
I.B.5.a.vi. (U) Overcollection	
received for a task ed selector contained communications typographical error. The collection was purged.	an NSA analyst discovered that traffic unrelated to the target because of a
I.B.5.a.vii. (U) Unauthorized Access	
with a target deemed not of interest, but the collection continued to be been purged.	collection associated the target was routed by mistake. All collection has
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) queried a database and accessed FAA §702 information or training. The query and results were deleted.	an NSA analyst was discovered to have without authorization
-(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) information from an unauthorized location. The analyst's discontinued	an NSA analyst accessed FAA §702 s access at that location was (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
assigned to a new organization that day was discovered to based on the access authorizations of her previous and results were deleted.	

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# I.B.5.b. (U) FAA Section 704

<del>(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)</del>	selectors were determined to have	
remained on task for collection during a target's	the United States. The	
selectors had been detasked	The selectors were	
immediately detasked and all associated co	ollection was deleted	
No reporting occurred.		
	_ \ \\ _ /	
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	an NSA analyst tasked USP	
selectors but failed to create	when the USP returned to the United	
States and the selectors remained tasks	ed. the analyst detasked	
the two selectors. No collection or reporting occurred.		
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	NSA analysts queried FAA §704	
tasked selectors in databases containing FAA §702 and	E.O. 12333 collection. Query results	
were deleted	(b) (1)	
	(b) (3) -P.L. 80	6-36
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	an NSA analyst discovered that	
and the same of th	nd been queried for selectors belonging to	
	en the target was not covered under FAA	
§704. The queries returned no results, and no reporting	g occurred.	
(U/ <del>FOUO)</del> On 28 June 2012, an NSA analyst p		
traffic databases. There was no collection and no report	ting. The analyst received remedial	
training		
training.		
-	(b) (1)	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b)	(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b)	(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)	
-	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b) I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b)	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b) I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b) I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b) I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b)  I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) FAA Section 705(b)  I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted.  (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) ed.	
I.B.5.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b)  I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the control of the co	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) <b>FAA Section 705(b)</b> I.B.5.c.i. (U) <b>Unauthorized Targeting</b> (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the selector after the FAA §705(b) authorization had expired USP selector in an FAA §702 raw traffic database. The	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 usc 3024(i)  ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) <b>FAA Section 705(b)</b> I.B.5.c.i. (U) <b>Unauthorized Targeting</b> (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the selector after the FAA §705(b) authorization had expire USP selector in an FAA §702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results.	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 Usc 3024(i)  ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the selector after the FAA §705(b) authorization had expired USP selector in an FAA §702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results. the I associated with the same USP in FAA §702	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 usc 3024(i)  ded.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector The analyst	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the FAA \$705(b) authorization had expired USP selector in an FAA \$702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results. The lassociated with the same USP in FAA \$702 immediately noticed his error and deleted the results.	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 usc 3024(i)  ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector  The analyst The analyst, who is experienced, is	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the FAA §705(b) authorization had expired USP selector in an FAA §702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results. The inassociated with the same USP in FAA §702 immediately noticed his error and deleted the results. The providing a training session for other branch members	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 usc 3024(i)  ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector  The analyst The analyst, who is experienced, is	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the FAA \$705(b) authorization had expired USP selector in an FAA \$702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results. The lassociated with the same USP in FAA \$702 immediately noticed his error and deleted the results.	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 usc 3024(i)  ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector  The analyst The analyst, who is experienced, is	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the FAA \$705(b) authorization had expired uSP selector in an FAA \$702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results. The lassociated with the same USP in FAA \$702 immediately noticed his error and deleted the results. The providing a training session for other branch members conducting queries associated with FISA targets.	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  red.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector The analyst The analyst, who is experienced, is on the special attention required when	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the FAA §705(b) authorization had expired USP selector in an FAA §702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results. The inassociated with the same USP in FAA §702 immediately noticed his error and deleted the results. The providing a training session for other branch members	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  Ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector The analyst The analyst, who is experienced, is on the special attention required when  (b) (1)	
I.B.5.c.i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting  (TS//SI//NF)  All database queries and results were deleted to the FAA \$705(b) authorization had expired uSP selector in an FAA \$702 raw traffic database. The mistakes and deleted the results. The lassociated with the same USP in FAA \$702 immediately noticed his error and deleted the results. The providing a training session for other branch members conducting queries associated with FISA targets.	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)  Ted.  an NSA analyst queried a USP ed. Moreover, the analyst queried the e analyst immediately recognized his NSA analyst queried a different selector The analyst The analyst, who is experienced, is on the special attention required when  (b) (1)	

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	TOP SECRET//	'SI//NOFORN	/ ,
	man.	and the state of t	/ \ \\
	men meneral reprint		The error occurred
because the selector had be	een inadvertently  Traffic collected		N
reports were issued.			196
reports were issued.			
e-mail selector associated incorrectly because of a ty the selector. No collection I.B.5.c.iii. (U) <b>Detasking</b>	with a target authorized pographical error. Upon occurred, and no report	under FAA §705(b) on discovery of the err	
I.D.J.C.III. (O) Detaskiii	g Delay	and the second s	
(TS//SI//REL TO to analyst discovered that the FAA §705(b) had remaine The analyst detasked the ta were issued.	e selectors associated wind tasked after the target	ith a USP and authoric thad entered the Unit	
I.C. (U) Consensual C	ollection		
(U) Nothing to repo	ort.		(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
I.D. (U) Dissemination	of U.S. Identities	/	
(TS//SI//NF) The N second quarter of CY2012 and the reports were cance U.S. organizations, or U.S was deleted as required, as minimization.	In SIGINT produced as NSA/CSS and entities named withou	ets, disseminations we at authorization. All d	nalysts learned of USPs, lata in the canceled repor
(U//FOUO) In past analysts included informat intelligence tasking. The providers in e-mail selecto therefore, may be named i and make our report more develop a new method of p	tion that identified USP majority of the U.S. ent ors. NSA now considers in disseminated SIGINT meaningful, NSA is no	s or U.S. entities while ity names were those is these names to be proportionally products. As a result providing that statistics.	of Internet service roducts and services and, t, to improve the accurac
I.E. (U) Counterintellig	ence Activities		
(U) Nothing to repo	ort.		(þ) (1)
I.F. (U) Detection and	Prevention of Violat	tions	(b) (3) -P.L. (b) (3) -50 U
(TS//SI//REL TO U and prevent violations, NS insight into a target's locat	SA/CSS has instituted a		zed telephony collection alysts greater and faster

D: 4165218 <i>TOP SI</i>	ECRET//SI//NOFORN	(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)
		Collected data was
purged from NSA/CSS's principal raw tr	raffic repositories when requi	
(ma)(a)(b)(b)		
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)		<del>4</del>
NSA analysts found	e-mail accounts	
1.522,	***************************************	Collected data was purged
from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic re-	positories when required.	(b) (1)
II. /ID NOA/OOO Office of the because		
II. (U) NSA/CSS Office of the Inspe Investigations, and Special Stud	dies	spections, (b) (3) -50 USC 302
intelligence activities to determine wheth Executive Orders, Attorney General (AG internal directives. With few exceptions, operating elements understand the restrict	b) procedures, and Department the problems uncovered we	nt of Defense (DoD) and re routine and showed that
II.A. (U) Annual Selector Review		(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 302
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Unconduct a yearly review of	nder AG-approved procedures	s, NSA/CSS is required to
conduct a yearry review or		As a result of the 2011
review, more thanselectors (r target offices concluded that the selectors	percent of the total reviewed) s no longer had foreign intell	were removed because the
II.B. (U) Trends Noted in the Annua	al Review of Quarterly IC	Reports for 2011 (3) -P.L.
(U/ <del>FOUO)</del> The NSA OIG publis reports for CY2011. The review highlighterrors:	shed an analysis of trends not	ed in the quarterly IO
<ul> <li>(U//<del>FOUO)</del> Failure to perform redatabase,</li> </ul>	quired research on selectors l	before querying raw traffic
<ul> <li>(U/<del>FOUO)</del> Detasking delays cau but did not detask immediately or</li> </ul>	•	1 0

- (U//<del>FOUO)</del> Dissemination of FISA or FAA data to e-mail distribution lists that included persons not trained to handle the data and systems not authorized to retain it.
- (U) The OIG advised the SIGINT Directorate to implement enhanced training and awareness procedures.

	II.C. (U) NSA/CSS Representative	** <u> </u>	\
	the SIGINT mission activities perform formal documentation that described responsibilities of designated IO personal for the completion of IO training by responsibilities of designated IO personal for the completion of IO training by responsibilities of arrival at the site was not enforced operational workforce had a sound known understanding of the handling of raw II.D. (U) NSA/CSS Representative (U//FOUO) As part of an NSA an IO inspection.	O program, IO training, and application med at the site. The inspector found the the scope of the overall IO program are onnel. The inspector also found that the newly assigned employees and reassign. A survey conducted at the site reveal nowledge of IO standards with some we SIGINT and of minimization and disseve	at the site lacked and delineated the he site's requirement nees within 30 days led that the reaknesses in the emination standards from the property of the pr
	overall lack of IO-related documentat		Managing core IO
	II.E. <del>(TS//SI//NF)</del>		
(b)(1)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		<u></u>
(b)(3)-P.L. 86	-36 <u>(TS//SI//NF)</u>	IQ inspectors reviewed the	The inspectors
		ce to IO policies and procedures, partic	
	and the application of IO standards lacked some IO documentation, particle for certain SIGINT disseminations.	cularly database access approvals for d	leployed analysts and
	lacked some IO documentation, partic		leployed analysts and (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	lacked some IO documentation, particle for certain SIGINT disseminations.		leployed analysts and (b) (1)
	lacked some IO documentation, particle for certain SIGINT disseminations.  II.F. (U) Unauthorized Intelligen	ce Activity	leployed analysts and (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	lacked some IO documentation, particle for certain SIGINT disseminations.  II.F. (U) Unauthorized Intelligen  (U) Nothing to report.	ce Activity	leployed analysts and (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	lacked some IO documentation, particle for certain SIGINT disseminations.  II.F. (U) Unauthorized Intelligen  (U) Nothing to report.  II.G. (U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGI	ce Activity	leployed analysts and (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	lacked some IO documentation, particle for certain SIGINT disseminations.  II.F. (U) Unauthorized Intelligen  (U) Nothing to report.  II.G. (U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGI  (U) Nothing to report.	ce Activity	leployed analysts and (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	lacked some IO documentation, particle for certain SIGINT disseminations.  II.F. (U) Unauthorized Intelligen  (U) Nothing to report.  II.G. (U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGI  (U) Nothing to report.  II.H. (U) Congressional and IO II	ce Activity	leployed analysts and (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

- III. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS IO Program
  - (U) Nothing to report.
- IV. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence -Related Activities and the Reason for the Changes
  - (U) Nothing to report.
- V. (U) Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect USP (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to IO Programs
  - (U) Nothing to report.
- VI. (U) Crimes Reporting

<del>(S//NF)</del>		
	tool being improperly	used by a U.S. service member
Analysis indicated that the service n	nember used the tool	The investigation
into this incident is ongoing.		
		< <i>[/</i>
		(b) (1)
		(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
		(b) $(3) - 50$ HSC $3024(i)$